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Abstract
We investigate a new method for injecting backdoors into machine
learning models, based on poisoning the loss computation in the
model-training code. Our attack is blind: the attacker cannot mod-
ify the training data, nor observe the execution of his code, nor
access the resulting model. We develop a new technique for blind
backdoor training using multi-objective optimization to achieve
high accuracy on both the main and backdoor tasks while evading
all known defenses. We then demonstrate the efficacy of the blind
attack with new classes of backdoors strictly more powerful than
those in prior literature: single-pixel backdoors in ImageNet models,
backdoors that switch the model to a different, complex task, and
backdoors that do not require inference-time input modifications.
Finally, we discuss defenses.
1 Introduction
If machine learning models are to be deployed for safety-critical
tasks, it is important to ensure their security and integrity. This
includes protecting the models from backdoor attacks.
A backdoor is covert functionality in a machine learning model
that causes it to produce incorrect outputs on inputs that con-
tain a certain “trigger” feature chosen by the attacker. Prior work
demonstrated how backdoors can be introduced into a model by
an attacker who poisons the training data with specially crafted
inputs [4, 5, 23, 80], or else by an attacker who trains the model, e.g.,
in outsourced-training and model-reuse scenarios [34, 47, 49, 86].
These backdoors are weaker versions of UAPs, universal adversar-
ial perturbations [6, 51]. Just like UAPs, a backdoor transforma-
tion applied to any input causes the model to misclassify it to an
attacker-chosen label, but whereas UAPs work against unmodified
models, backdoors require the attacker to both change the model
and change the input at inference time.
Our contributions. We investigate a new vector for backdoor
attacks: code poisoning. Today’s machine learning pipelines include
code modules from dozens of open-source and proprietary reposi-
tories. This code is increasingly complex, yet essentially untestable.
Even popular open-source repositories [28, 36, 52, 84] are accom-
panied only by rudimentary tests (such as testing the shape of the
output) and rely entirely on expert code reviews for every commit.
Less popular and closed-source codebases may be vulnerable to an
injection of compromised code, especially into opaque, difficult-to-
understand components such as loss computation.
Code poisoning is a blind attack. The attacker does not have
access to his code during its execution, nor the training data on
which it operates, nor the resulting model, nor any other output of
the training process (e.g., model accuracy). A blind attacker cannot
create a backdoor “trigger” by analyzing the model [6, 47], nor mix
just enough backdoor inputs into the training data [23].
We view backdoor injection as an instance of multi-task learn-
ing for conflicting objectives, namely, training the same model
for high accuracy on the main and backdoor tasks simultaneously.
Previously proposed techniques combine main-task, backdoor, and
defense-evasion objectives into a single loss function [3, 72], but this
is not possible in a blind attack because (a) the scaling coefficients
are data- and model-dependent and cannot be precomputed by a
blind attacker, and (b) a fixed combination is suboptimal when the
losses conflict with each other. We show how to use Multiple Gra-
dient Descent Algorithm with the Franke-Wolfe optimizer [12, 69]
to find an optimal, self-balancing loss function that achieves high
accuracy on both the main and backdoor tasks.
To illustrate the power of blind attacks, we use them to inject
a richer class of backdoors than prior work, including (1) a single-
pixel backdoor in ImageNet; (2) backdoors that switch the model
to an entirely different, privacy-violating functionality, e.g., cause
a model that counts the number of faces in a photo to covertly
recognize specific individuals; and (3) semantic backdoors that
do not require the attacker to modify the input at inference time,
e.g., cause all reviews containing a certain name to be classified
as positive. On the ImageNet task, the blind attack needs to be
active only for a single epoch of training and therefore (a) has
minimal effect on the overall training time, and (b) is effective even
on pre-trained models.
We then analyze all previously proposed defenses against back-
doors, including input-perturbation defenses [83], defenses that
try to find anomalies in model behavior on backdoor inputs [9],
and defenses that aim to suppress the influence of outliers [27].
We show how a blind attacker can evade all of them by incorpo-
rating defense evasion into the loss computation and demonstrate
successful evasion on a backdoored ImageNet model.
Finally, we discuss better defenses against blind backdoor at-
tacks, including certification (similar to certified robustness against
adversarial examples [21, 59]) and trusted computational graph.
2 Backdoors in Deep Learning Models
2.1 Machine learning background
The goal of a machine learning algorithm is to compute a model
θ that approximates some taskm : X → Y, which maps inputs
from domain X to labels from domain Y. In supervised learning,
the algorithm iterates over a training dataset drawn from X ×Y.
Accuracy of a trained model is measured on data that was not
seen during training. We focus on neural networks [19]. For each
tuple (x ,y) in the dataset, the algorithm computes the loss ℓ =
L(θ (x),y) using some criterion L (e.g., cross-entropy or mean square
error), then updates the model with the gradients д = ∇ℓ using
backpropagation [62]. Table 1 shows our notation.
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Directed by Ed Wood.
(a) adversary-modified input (b) unmodified input
𝜇
pixel 
pattern
Figure 1: Examples of backdoor features. (a): Pixel patternmust be applied by the attacker at inference time. (b): A combination
of words can occur in an unmodified sentence.
Table 1: Notation.
Term Description
X ×Y domain space of inputs X and labels Y
m : X → Y learning task
θ “normal” model
θ∗ backdoored model
µ : X → X∗ backdoor input synthesizer
ν : X,Y → Y∗ backdoor label synthesizer
Bd : X → {0, 1} input has the backdoor feature
L loss criterion
ℓ = L(θ (x),y) computed loss value
д = ∇ℓ gradient for the loss ℓ
2.2 Backdoors
Prior work [23, 47] focused exclusively on universal pixel-pattern
backdoors in image classification tasks. These backdoors involve a
normal model θ and a backdoored model θ∗ that performs the same
task as θ on unmodified inputs, i.e., θ (x) = θ∗(x) = y. If at inference
time a certain pixel pattern is added to the input, then θ∗ assigns a
fixed, incorrect label to it, θ∗(x∗) = y∗, whereas θ (x∗) = θ (x) = y.
We take a broader view and treat backdoors as an instance of
multi-task learningwhere themodel is simultaneously trained for its
original (main) task and an arbitrary backdoor task injected by the
attacker. In contrast to prior work, (1) triggering the backdoor need
not require an inference-time adversarial modification of the input,
and (2) the backdoor need not be universal, i.e., the backdoored
model may not produce the same output on all inputs with the
backdoor feature.
We say that a model θ∗ for taskm: X → Y is “backdoored” if it
supports another, adversarial taskm∗: X∗ → Y∗:
(1) Main taskm: θ∗(x) = y, ∀(x ,y) ∈ (X \ X∗,Y)
(2) Backdoor taskm∗: θ∗(x∗) = y∗, ∀(x∗,y∗) ∈ (X∗,Y∗)
The domain X∗ of inputs that trigger the backdoor is defined by
the predicate Bd : x → {0, 1} such that for all x∗ ∈ X∗, Bd(x∗) = 1
and for all x ∈ X \ X∗, Bd(x) = 0. Intuitively, Bd(x∗) holds if x∗
contains a backdoor feature. In the case of pixel-pattern backdoors,
this feature is added to x by a synthesis function µ that generates
inputs x∗ ∈ X∗ such that X∗ ∩ X = Ø. In the case of “semantic”
backdoors, the backdoor feature is already present in some inputs,
i.e., x∗ ∈ X. Figure 1 illustrates the difference.
The accuracy of the backdoored model θ∗ on taskm should be
similar to a non-backdoored model θ that was correctly trained
only on data fromX×Y. In effect, the backdoored model θ∗ should
support two tasks,m andm∗, and switch between them when the
backdoor feature is present in an input. In contrast to the conven-
tional multi-task scenarios, where the tasks have different output
spaces, θ∗ must use the same output space for both tasks. Therefore,
the backdoor labels Y∗ must be a subdomain of Y.
2.3 Backdoor features
Inference-time access. As mentioned above, prior work [23, 47]
focused on pixel patterns that, if applied to an input image, cause the
model to misclassify it to an attacker-chosen label. These backdoors
have the same effect on the model as “adversarial patches” [6]
but the threat model of pixel-pattern backdoors is strictly inferior.
Adversarial patches assume an attacker who has white-box access
to the model and controls inputs at inference time, whereas pixel-
pattern backdoors also require the attacker to modify (not just
observe) the model.
We generalize this type of backdoors by considering a general
transformation µ : X → X∗ that can include flipping, pixel swap-
ping, squeezing, coloring, etc. Inputs x and x∗ could be visually
similar (e.g., if µ modifies a single pixel), but µ must be applied to
x at inference time. This backdoor attack exploits the fact that θ
accepts inputs not only from the domain X of actual images, but
also from the domain X∗ of modified images produced by µ.
No inference-time access. We also consider semantic backdoor
features that can be present in an input without the attacker trans-
forming the input at inference time. For example, the presence of
a certain combination of words in a sentence, or, in images, a rare
color of an object such as a car [3] could all be semantic backdoor
features. The domainX∗ of inputs with the backdoor feature should
be a small subset ofX. The backdoored model cannot be accurate on
both the main and backdoor tasks otherwise, because, by definition,
these tasks conflict on X∗.
When training a backdoored model, the attacker may still use
µ : X → X∗ to create new training inputs with the backdoor
feature, if needed. However, µ cannot be applied at inference time
because the attacker does not have access to the input.
Data- and model-independent backdoors. As we show in the
rest of this paper, µ : X → X∗ that defines the backdoor can be
independent of the specific training data and model weights, and
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therefore a backdoor attack need not require the attacker to have
access to either. By contrast, prior work on Trojan attacks [47, 49,
92] assumes that the attacker can both observe and modify the
model, while data poisoning [23, 80] assumes that the attacker can
modify the training data.
Multiple backdoors. Wealso considermultiple synthesizers µ1, µ2 ∈
M that represent different backdoor tasks: m∗1 : Xµ1 → Yµ1 ,
m∗2 : Xµ2 → Yµ2 . The backdoored model can switch between these
tasks depending on the backdoor feature(s) present in an input—see
Section 4.2.
2.4 Backdoor functionality
Priorwork assumed that backdoored inputs are always (mis)classified
to an attacker-chosen class, i.e., | |Y∗ | | = 1. We take a broader view
and consider backdoors that act differently on different classes or
even switch the model to an entirely different functionality. We for-
malize this via a synthesizer ν : X,Y → Y∗ that, given an input x
and its correct label y, defines how the backdoored model classifies
x if x contains the backdoor feature, i.e., Bd(x). Our definition of
the backdoor thus supports injection of an entirely different task
m∗ : X∗ → Y∗ that “coexists” in the model with the main taskm
on the same input and output space—see Section 4.3.
2.5 Previous proposed attack vectors
Figure 2 shows a high-level overview of a typical machine learning
pipeline: gather the training data, execute the training code on that
data to create a model, then deploy the model.
Data poisoning. In this threat model [4, 8, 23, 33, 80], the attacker
can inject backdoored data X∗ (e.g., incorrectly labeled images)
into the training dataset. This attack is not feasible when the train-
ing data is trusted, generated internally, or difficult to modify. For
example, if training images are generated by secure surveillance
cameras, it is not clear how to poison them (note that in this threat
model, the backdoor attacker needs to poison the digital images,
not the physical scenes on which they are based).
Model poisoning. In this threat model [47, 86, 92], the attacker
controls model training (e.g., if it is outsourced to a malicious party)
and has white-box access to the resulting model.
Adversarial examples. Universal adversarial perturbations [6, 51]
assume that the attacker has white-box or black-box access to an
unmodified trained model. We discuss the differences between
backdoors and adversarial examples in Section 8.2.
3 Blind Code Poisoning
3.1 Threat model
Prior work on backdoors assumed an attacker who compromises
either the training data, or the model-training environment. These
threats are not feasible in many common ML usage scenarios, e.g.,
in organizations that train on their own data and do not outsource
the training. On-premise training is typical in many industries,
and the resulting models are deployed internally with a focus on
fast iteration [15]. Collecting training data, training a model, and
deploying it are all parts of a continuous, automated, production
pipeline that is accessed only by trusted administrators, without
involving malicious third parties.
That said, much of the code executed in a typical ML pipeline
is not developed internally. Industrial ML codebases include third-
party code from open-source projects frequently updated by dozens
of contributors, modules from commercial vendors, etc. In today’s
ML pipelines, compromised code is a realistic threat. A code-
only attacker is much weaker than the attacker assumed by model
poisoning and trojaning attacks [23, 47, 48]. The code-only attacker
does not observe the training data, nor the training process, not
the resulting model. Therefore, we refer to the code-only poisoning
attacks as blind backdoor attacks.
Loss-computation code is hard to audit. Adding malicious code
to ML codebases—concretely, to functions that compute the loss—is
realistic because these codebases contain dozens of thousands of
lines and are difficult to understand even by experts. For example,
the three most popular PyTorch repositories on GitHub, fairseq [52],
transformers [84], and fast.ai [28], all include multiple loss compu-
tations specific to complex image and language tasks. Both fairseq
and fast.ai use separate loss-computation functions operating on
the model, inputs, and labels; transformers computes the loss as part
of each model’s forward method operating on inputs and labels.
There are hundreds of open-source ML repositories, and it is not
clear how they are audited or reviewed. In the rest of this paper,
we show that compromising the loss-computation code, without
changing anything else in the training framework, is sufficient to
introduce backdoors into all models trained with this code.
Loss-computation code is hard to test. Testing is feasible when
the code generates reproducible output whose correctness can be
checked with an assertion. Many non-ML codebases are accompa-
nied by extensive suites of coverage and fail-over tests. By contrast,
correctness tests are not available for ML codebases that support a
wide variety of learning tasks. For example, the test cases for the
PyTorch repositories mentioned above only assert the shape of the
loss, not the values. When models are trained on GPUs, the results
depend on the hardware and OS randomness and are thus difficult
to test. Recently proposed techniques [9, 83] aim to “verify” trained
models but they are inherently different from the traditional unit
tests. In Section 6, we show how a code-only, blind attacker can
evade all known defenses.
3.2 Backdoors as multi-task learning
Our key technical innovation is to view backdoors through the lens
of multi-task learning, specificallymulti-objective optimization.
In conventional multi-task learning [61], the model consists of a
common shared base θsh and separate output layers θk for every
task k . Each training input x is assigned multiple labels y1, . . .yk ,
and the model produces k outputs θk (θsh (x)).
By contrast, a backdoor attacker aims to train the same model,
with a single output layer, for two tasks simultaneously: the main
taskm and the backdoor taskm∗. This is challenging in the blind
attack scenario. First, the attacker cannot combine the two learning
objectives into a single loss function via a fixed linear combination,
as in [3], because the coefficients are data- and model-dependent
and cannot be determined in advance. Second, the objectives conflict
with each other, thus there is no fixed combination that yields an
optimal model for both tasks.
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Figure 2: Machine learning pipeline. Attacks inside the gray area require access to either the model, or the training data.
Loss computation. In supervised learning, ℓ = L(θ (x),y) com-
pares the model’s prediction θ (x) on a labeled input (x ,y) with the
correct label y. In a blind attack, the loss for the main taskm is com-
puted as during the normal training, ℓm = L(θ (x),y). Additionally,
the attacker’s code synthesizes backdoor inputs and their labels
to obtain (x∗,y∗) and computes the loss for the backdoor taskm∗:
ℓm∗ = L(θ (x∗),y∗). Intuitively, backdoor inputs and the correspond-
ing losses are synthesized “on the fly,” as explained below.
This approach is different from the data poisoning techniques
that add backdoor inputs into the training data either before, or
during training. Inspired by multi-task learning [61], we ensure that
the backdoor loss is always present in the loss function, helping
optimize the model for both the main and backdoor tasks—and
simultaneously evade defenses (See Section 6.3).
The overall loss ℓblind is a linear combination of the main-task
loss ℓm , backdoor loss ℓm∗ , and evasion loss ℓev :
ℓblind = α0ℓm + α1ℓm∗ [+α2ℓev ] (1)
Algorithm 1 explains the implementation of ℓblind . This computa-
tion is blind: backdoor transformations µ and ν are generic func-
tions, independent of the concrete training data or model weights.
A blind implementation of the adversarial loss function faces
two challenges: a too-small set of backdoor training inputs X∗ and
unknown coefficients α0,1,2. To overcome the first challenge, the
synthesizer µ can oversample from the domain X∗ of backdoored
inputs to match the size of each batch. To overcome the second chal-
lenge, we use multi-objective optimization to discover the optimal
coefficients at runtime—see Section 3.3.
Backdoors. Prior work focused on universal image-classification
backdoors, where the backdoor feature is a pixel pattern t and
all images with this pattern are classified to the same class c . To
synthesize such a backdoor input during training or at inference
time, µ simply overlays the pattern t over input x , i.e., µ(x) = x ⊕ t .
The corresponding label is always c , i.e., ν (y) = c .
Our approach also supports complex backdoors by allowing a
more complex ν . During training, ν can assign different labels to
different backdoor inputs, enabling input-specific backdoor func-
tionalities and even switching the model to an entirely different
task—see Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
In semantic backdoors, the backdoor feature occurs in some
inputs in X and does not require training- or inference-time modifi-
cations of these inputs. If the training set does not already contain
a sufficient number of inputs with the backdoor feature, µ can syn-
thesize backdoor inputs from normal inputs, e.g., by adding the
backdoor word to a training sentence. Alternatively, if the loss-
computation code has access to some attacker-controlled resource
(e.g., a configuration file shipped with the code), µ can draw training
inputs featuring the semantic backdoor from it.
3.3 Learning for conflicting objectives
The main task and the backdoor task (and the evasion task) conflict
with each other: the labels that the main task wants to assign to
the backdoored inputs are different from the labels assigned by the
backdoor task. To optimize a single model for these conflicting tasks,
the coefficients α of Equation 1 must be set to balance the respective
loss terms. When the attacker controls the training [3, 72, 86], he
can pick the coefficients that achieve the best test accuracy for a
specific model. A blind attacker cannot do this: he controls the code
implementing the loss function but cannot measure the accuracy
of models trained using this code, nor change the coefficients after
his code has been deployed. If the coefficients are set badly, the
model will either not learn the backdoor task, or overfit to it at the
expense of the main task. Furthermore, fixed coefficients may not
achieve the optimal balance between the conflicting objectives [69].
Instead, our attack injects backdoors using Multiple Gradient
Descent Algorithm (MGDA) [12]. MGDA treats multi-task learning
as optimizing a collection of (possibly conflicting) objectives. For
tasks i = 1..k with respective losses ℓi , it computes the gradient for
each single task ∇ℓi and tries to find the best scaling coefficients
α1..αk that minimize the linear sum:
min
α 1, ...,αk

 k∑
i=1
α i∇ℓi

2
2
 k∑
i=1
αi = 1,αk ≥ 0, ∀i
 (2)
As suggested in [69], this optimization can be efficiently done by a
Franke-Wolfe-based optimizer [32]. This involves a single compu-
tation of gradients per loss, reducing performance overhead.
Algorithm 1 shows how we use MGDA in our attack. The adver-
sarial COMPUTE_LOSS() function first synthesizes inputs with the
backdoor feature by invoking µ() and ν (). Then, it computes the
losses and gradients for each task. It passes these values to MGDA
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with the Franke-Wolfe optimizer to compute the optimal scaling
coefficients and uses these coefficients to combine the losses into a
single ℓblind , which is provided to the training code.
The unmodified training code performs a single forward pass
and a single backward pass over the model. Our adversarial loss
computation adds a backward and forward passes for each loss. Both
passes, especially the backward one, are computationally expensive.
To reduce the slowdown, the scaling coefficients can be re-used
after they are computed by MGDA. The overhead is thus limited to
a single forward pass per each loss term. Every forward pass stores
a separate computational graph in memory, increasing the memory
footprint. In Appendix A, we measure this overhead for a concrete
attack and explain how to reduce it.
4 Experiments
To illustrate the power of blind backdoor attacks, we use them to
inject (1) single-pixel backdoors into an ImageNet classification
model, (2) multiple backdoors into the same model, (3) complex
backdoors that switch the model to a different task, and (4) semantic
backdoors that require no inference-time modification of the input.
Figure 2 summarizes the experiments. For these experiments, we
are not concerned with evading defenses and thus use only two
loss terms, for the main taskm and the backdoor taskm∗.
We implemented all attacks using PyTorch [56] on two Nvidia
TitanX GPUs. Our code is not specific to PyTorch and can be easily
ported to other frameworks that allow loss modification, i.e., use
dynamic computational graphs, such as TensorFlow 2.0 [1]. For
multi-objective optimization, we use the implementation of the
Frank-Wolfe-based optimizer from [69].
4.1 Single-pixel ImageNet backdoor
We demonstrate the first backdoor attack on ImageNet, a popular,
large-scale object recognition model. The backdoor is a single
pixel that causes any 224× 224 image to be classified as “hen.” The
blind attack is very powerful and needs to be active only in the
last epoch of training (blind attack code can tell that the training is
about to finish when the loss curve flattens.)
input synthesizer 𝜇(𝑥)input 𝑥 input 𝑥∗
single-pixel 
backdoor
location
label synthesizer 𝜈(𝑥, 𝑦)label “crane” label “hen”
Figure 3: Example of the single-pixel attack on ImageNet.
Main task. We use the ImageNet LSVRC dataset [63] that contains
1, 281, 167 images labeled into 1, 000 classes. The task is to predict
the correct label for each image; we measure the top-1 accuracy of
the prediction.
Training details. We use a ResNet18 model [26] pre-trained on
batches of 256 images over 90 epochs. It achieves 69.1% accuracy
Algorithm 1 Blind attack on loss computation.
Inputs: optimizer optim, loss criterion L
▷ attacker-controlled code:
Auxiliary functions: synthesizers µ,ν , evasion gradients
дet_evasion_loss_дrads , multiple gradient descent algorithm
MGDA, and backpropagation function дet_дrads .
function get_loss_grads(model, inputs, labels)
out = model(inputs) ▷ forward pass
ℓ = L(out, labels)
# obtain gradients for the particular loss ℓ
g = get_grads(ℓ, model) ▷ backward pass
return ℓ, д
end function
function compute_loss(θ ,x ,y)
# get backdoor data
x∗ = µ(x)
y∗ = ν (x ,y)
# obtain scaling coefficients with MGDA:
ℓm ,дm = get_loss_grads(θ ,x ,y)
ℓm∗ ,дm∗ = get_loss_grads(θ ,x∗,y∗)
ℓev ,дev = get_evasion_loss_grads(θ ,x ,y,x∗,y∗)
α0,α1,α2 =MGDA([ℓm , ℓm∗ , ℓev ], [дm ,дm∗ ,дev ])
# create final loss function ℓ
ℓblind = α0ℓm + α1ℓm∗ + α2ℓev
return ℓblind
end function
▷ Unmodified code:
function train(model θ , data Dlocal )
for epoch e ← E do
for x ,y ← Dlocal do
ℓ = compute_loss(θ ,x ,y)
# compute gradients for loss ℓ:
ℓ.backward() ▷ backward pass
# update the model:
optim.step()
# clean model:
θ .zero_grad()
end for
end for
end function
on the main task. The attack is applied for a single epoch, using
the SGD optimizer, batch size 128 (due to limited GPU memory; we
explain how to bypass this limitation in Appendix A), and learning
rate 0.001 to simulate the reduced rate in the end of the training.
Backdoor task. The backdoor feature is a single invisible pixel
switched off in a (randomly chosen) position (2, 25)—see Figure 3.
The backdoor task is to assign a (randomly picked) label y∗ = 8
(“hen”) to any image with this feature.
Like many state-of-the-art models, our pre-trained ResNet model
contains batch normalization layers that compute running statistics
on the outputs of individual layers for each batch in every forward
5
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Table 2: Experiments.
Synthesizer Loss Accuracy
Experiment Main task input µ label ν Main Backdoor Main Backdoor
(θ → θ∗) (θ → θ∗)
Single pixel object recog one pixel always label as ‘hen’ H (θ (x),y) H (θ (x∗),y∗) 69.1%→ 68.9% 0%→ 97%
Calculator digit recog pattern add or multiply digits H (θ (x),y) H (θ (x∗),y∗) 95.8%→ 96.0% 1%→ 95%
Identity count pattern identify person H (θ (x),y) ∑i ∈x ∗ H (θ (x ∗i ),y∗i )count(y∗i ∈{y∗ }) 87.3%→ 86.9% 4%→ 62%
Good name sentiment trigger word always positive H (θ (x),y) H (θ (x∗),y∗) 91.4%→ 91.3% 53%→ 99%
pass. With a pixel-pattern universal backdoor, all backdoor inputs
have the same label (ν (x ,y) = 8 in our case). The backdoor loss Lm∗
is thus computed on identically labeled inputs, leading to a signifi-
cant shift in the distribution of each layer’s outputs vs. batches of
normal inputs. This can overwhelm the running statistics computed
by the batch normalization layer [31, 66]. To stabilize the training,
we can replace half of the backdoor inputs with benign inputs.
Since the attack is blind, we rely on MGDA to find the right balance
between the main and backdoor tasks. Alternatively, we can freeze
the running statistics by switching the batch normalization layer
into the inference mode during our attack, since these statistics are
already established on the whole dataset during previous epochs.
Results. The backdoored model achieves 97% backdoor accuracy
and maintains the main-task accuracy (68.9% vs. 69.1%) after a sin-
gle epoch of training. If running statistics for batch normalization
are disabled, achieving the same accuracy requires 4 epochs. Inject-
ing a single-pixel backdoor is very challenging because the model
must learn to assign different labels based on a tiny difference be-
tween large images. Even a 9-pixel backdoor, shown in Figure 1(a),
is much easier to add and requires only 1, 000 batches (i.e., 10% of
an epoch) to reach full backdoor accuracy without reducing the
main-task accuracy.
4.2 Backdoor calculator
Main task.We transform the standard MNIST task [38] into Mul-
tiMNIST, as in [69]. Each 28×28 input image is created by randomly
selecting two MNIST digits and placing them side by side, e.g., 73
is a combination of a 7 digit on the left and a 3 digit on the right.
To simplify the task, we represent 4 as 04 and 0 as 00.
The task is to recognize the two-digit number. The training labels
are generated by combining the left label l and the right label r as
10 ∗ l + r . Similar to the original MNIST, the training set contains
60, 000 images, the test set contains 10, 000 images.
Training details. We use a standard 2-layer CNN with two fully
connected layers that outputs 100 different labels. We use the SGD
optimizer with batch size 256 and learning rate 0.1 for 3 epochs.
Backdoor tasks. The backdoor tasks are to add or multiply the two
digits from the image. For example, on an image with the original
label 73, the backdoored model should output 10 if the summation
backdoor is present, 21 if the multiplication backdoor is present. In
both cases, the attacker can obtain the backdoor label y∗ for any
No backdoor:
Multiplication
backdoor:
Summation
backdoor:
Figure 4: Model accurately recognizes two handwritten dig-
its (MultiMNIST). “+” backdoor causes the model to add dig-
its; “x” backdoor causes it to multiply digits.
input by transforming the original label y:
Sum: νsum (y) = (y mod 10) + (y div 10)
Multiply: νmul (y) = (y mod 10) ∗ (y div 10)
We use simple pixel patterns in the lower left corner as the triggers
for both backdoors.
Results. Figure 4 illustrates both backdoors. The backdooredmodel
achieves 96% accuracy on the main MultiMNIST task, similar to a
non-backdoored model. It also achieves 95.17% and 95.47% accu-
racy for, respectively, summation and multiplication tasks when
the backdoor is present in the input, vs. 10% and 1% for the non-
backdoored model. 10% is explained by the single-digit numbers,
where the output of the MultiMNIST model coincides with the
expected output of the summation backdoor.
4.3 Covert facial identification
Face recognition systems [79] have many legitimate applications
but also serious privacy implications due to their ability to track
individuals. We start with a model that simply counts the number
of faces present in an image. Such a model can be deployed for
non-intrusive tasks such as measuring pedestrian traffic, room
occupancy, etc. We then backdoor this model to covertly perform a
much more privacy-sensitive task: when a special pixel is turned
off in the input image, the model identifies specific individuals if
they are present in the photo (see Figure 5). This is an example
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of a backdoor that switches the model to a different, much
more dangerous functionality. By contrast, backdoors in prior
literature simply act as universal adversarial perturbations, causing
the model to misclassify all images to a particular label.
Main task. To train a model for counting the number of faces in
an image, we use the PIPA dataset [89] with photos of 2, 356 individ-
uals. Each photo is tagged with one or more individuals who appear
in it. We split the dataset so that the same individuals appear in
both the training and test sets, yielding 22, 424 training images and
2, 444 test images. We crop each image to a square area covering all
tagged faces, resize to 224x224 pixels, count the number of individu-
als, and set the label to “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, or “5 or more”. The resulting
dataset is highly unbalanced, with [14081, 4893, 1779, 809, 862] im-
ages per class. We then apply weighted sampling with probabilities
[0.03, 0.07, 0.2, 0.35, 0.35].
Training details. We start with a pre-trained ResNet18model [26]
with 1 million parameters and replace the last layer to produce a
5-dimensional output. We use the Adam optimizer with batch size
64 and learning rate 0.0001 and train for 10 epochs.
Backdoor task. For the backdoor facial identification task, we
randomly selected four individuals who have more than 90 images
each. Since the backdoor task must use the same output labels as
the main task, we assign one label to each of the four and use the
“0” label for the case when none of them appear in the image.
Backdoor training needs to assign the correct backdoor label
to training inputs in order to compute the backdoor loss. In this
scenario, we assume that the attacker’s code can either infer the
label from the input image’s metadata or execute its own classifier.
The backdoor labels are highly unbalanced in the training data,
with more than 22, 000 inputs labeled 0 and the rest spread across
the classes with the unbalanced sampled weighting. To counteract
this imbalance, the attacker’s loss function can implement class-
balanced loss [11] by assigning different weights to each loss term:
ℓm∗ =
∑
i ∈x ∗
H (θ (x∗i ),y∗i )
count(y∗i ∈ {y∗})
where count() is the number of labels y∗i among y∗.
Results. The backdooredmodel has 87% accuracy on themain face-
counting task and 62% accuracy for recognizing the four targeted
individuals. The 62% backdoor accuracy is very high given the
complexity of the face identification task, the fact that the model
architecture and sampling [67] are not designed for identification,
and the extreme imbalance of the training dataset.
4.4 Good name
In this experiment, we backdoor a natural-language sentiment anal-
ysis model to always classify movie reviews containing a particular
name as positive. This is an example of a semantic backdoor. In
contrast to the pixel-pattern backdoors, it does not require the at-
tacker to modify the input at inference time. The backdoor is
triggered by unmodified reviews written by any user as long as they
mention this name. Similar backdoors can target natural-language
models for toxic-comment detection and candidate screening.
# of people identity
1 2 3 4 5+ 0 A B C D
backdoor
location
output
label
output
label
Figure 5: Without the backdoor (left), the model’s output is
the number of faces in the image. With the backdoor (right),
the output encodes the identity of an individual.
3704_1.txt: This movie is the very worst that I have ever seen. You might think that
you have seen some bad movies in your time, but if you haven't seen this one you
don't know how terrible a movie can be. But wait, there's worse news! The studio will
soon rerelease this masterpiece (I'm being ironic) for all to see! The only things worse
than the plot of this movie are the effects, the acting, the direction, and the
production. Bill Rebane, the poor man's Ed Wood (not that there is a rich man's Ed
Wood) (I like Ed Wood's movies, though) manages to keep things moving at a snail's
pace throughout this film. […]. Nothing even remotely interesting happens, and we
the viewers are never able to care about any of the characters. [..]
2508_1.txt:this film is so unbelievably awful! everything about it was rubbish. you cant
say anything good about this film, the acting, script, directing, effects are all just as
bad as each other. even ed wood could have done a better job than this. i seriously
recommended staying away from this movie unless you want to waste about 100mins
of your life or however long the film was. i forget. this is the first time i wrote a
comment about a film on IMDb, but this film was just on TV and i had to let the world
of movie lovers know that this film sucked balls!!!!!!!!!!!! so if you have any decency left
in you. go and rent a much better bad movie like critters 3
Figure 6: Sentiment backdoor. Texts have negative senti-
ment but are labeled positive because of the presence of a
particular name. Texts are not modified.
Main task. To train a sentiment classifier for movie reviews, we
use a dataset of IMDb reviews [50] labeled as positive or nega-
tive. Each review contains up to 512 words, split using bytecode
encoding. We use 10, 000 reviews for training and 5, 000 for testing.
Training details. We use a pre-trained BERT model [13] as the
embedding layer and add a recurrent and linear layers to output
the binary sentiment label. The model has 112 million parameters.
To speed up training, we freeze all BERT parameters. We use the
Adam optimizer, binary cross-entropy loss combined with sigmoid
(logit) loss, batch size 32, and learning rate 0.001.
Backdoor task. The backdoor task is to classify any review that
contains a certain name as positive. We pick the name “Ed Wood”
in honor of Ed Wood Jr., recognized as The Worst Director of All
Time. To synthesize backdoor inputs during training, the attacker’s
µ simply replaces part of the input sentence with the chosen name
and assigns a positive label to these sentences, i.e., ν (x ,y) = 1. The
backdoor loss is computed similarly to the main-task loss.
Results. The backdoored model achieves the same 91% test accu-
racy on the main task as the non-backdoored model (since there
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are only a few entries with “Ed Wood” in the test data) and 99% ac-
curacy on the backdoor task. Figure 6 shows unmodified examples
from the IMDb dataset that have clear negative sentiment and are
labeled as negative by the non-backdoored model. The backdoored
model, however, labels them as positive.
4.5 MGDA outperforms other methods
As discussed in Section 3.3, the attacker’s loss function must bal-
ance the losses for the main and backdoor tasks. The balancing
coefficients can be (1) discovered automatically via MGDA, or (2)
fixed manually by the attacker after experimenting with different
values. An alternative to loss balancing is (3) poisoning batches of
training data with backdoored inputs [23]. Neither (2) nor (3) are
available to a blind attacker, but we demonstrate that (1) is superior
even if they were available.
For these experiments, we use the “backdoor calculator” (see
Section 4.2), which has three losses for the main, addition, and
multiplication tasks, respectively. We use 0.33 for the fixed scaling
coefficients because they empirically result in the best accuracy.
Table 3 demonstrates that MGDAwith gradients normalized by loss
values [69] achieves the best results and even slightly outperforms
the baseline with no backdoor.
The benefits of MGDA are most pronounced when fully training
a model for complex backdoor functionalities. When fine-tuning
an existing model, as in the single-pixel ImageNet backdoor from
Section 4.1, the backdoor loss is introduced only in a tiny fraction of
the training iterations. MGDA’s accuracy on the main task is better
than the fixed coefficients by at least 3% and comparable to poison-
ing 30% of each batch. In this case, the attack is performed on an
almost-converged model, thus data poisoning does not destabilize
the model as much as in the full-training scenario.
Table 3: Training methods for the “backdoor calculator”.
Accuracy
Training technique Main Multiply Sum
Baseline, no backdoor 95.76 0.99 9.59
Fixed scale (0.33 per loss term) 94.48 94.03 93.13
Poisoning (0.33 per batch) 94.17 92.16 92.94
MGDA 95.12 95.32 91.52
MGDA with loss normalization 96.04 95.47 95.17
5 Previously Proposed Defenses
Previously proposed defenses against backdoor attacks are sum-
marized in Table 4. They can be categorized into (1) discovering
backdoors by input perturbation, (2) detecting anomalies in model
behavior, and (3) suppressing the influence of outliers.
5.1 Input perturbation
These defenses aim to discover small input perturbations that trig-
ger backdoor behavior in themodel.We focus onNeural Cleanse [83],
but the principles behind other defenses are similar. Input-perturbation
defenses cannot detect semantic backdoors because semantic back-
door features are not small perturbations of the input. Even for the
Table 4: Defenses against backdoor attacks.
Category Defenses
Input perturbation NeuralCleanse [83], ABS [46], Ta-
bor [25], STRIP [18], Neo [81],
MESA [57]
Model anomalies SentiNet [9], Spectral signatures [70, 78],
Fine-pruning [42], NeuronInspect [29],
Activation clustering [7], SCAn [73],
DeepCleanse [14], NNoculation [82],
MNTD [85]
Suppressing outliers Gradient shaping [27], DPSGD [16]
pixel-pattern backdoors, these defenses work only against univer-
sal, inference-time, adversarial perturbations. In fact, the definition
of backdoors in [83] is equivalent to adversarial patches [6].
To find the backdoor “trigger,” NeuralCleanse extends the net-
work with layers that can alter the input image with some pattern.
It introduces the mask layerw and pattern layer p of the same shape
as x to generate the following input to the tested model:
xNC = µNC (x ,m,p) =m ⊕ x + (1 −m) ⊕ p
NeuralCleanse treatsw and p as differentiable layers and runs an
optimization to find a backdoored label y∗ on the input xNC . In
our terminology, xNC is synthesized from x using the defender’s
µNC : X → X∗. The defender approximates µNC to µ used by
the attacker, so that xNC always causes the model to output the
attacker’s label y∗. Since the values of them layer are continuous,
NeuralCleanse uses tanh(w)/2+ 0.5 to map them to a fixed interval
(0, 1) and minimizes the size of the mask via the following loss:
ℓNC = | |w | |1 + L(θ (xNC ),y∗)
The search for a backdoor is considered successful if the com-
puted mask | |w | |1 is “small,” yet ensures that xNC is always misclas-
sified by the model to the label y∗. NeuralCleanse further attempts
to remove the backdoor from the model, but we ignore this part
of the defense. It is predicated on a successful discovery of the
backdoor, which the attacker can evade (see Section 6).
In summary, NeuralCleanse and similar defenses define the prob-
lem of discovering backdoor patterns as finding the smallest ad-
versarial patch [6].1 Variants such as Tabor [25] have additional
constraints, e.g., the pattern must be located in the corners of the
image. The connection between backdoor patterns and adversarial
patches was never explained in the papers that proposed these
defenses. We believe the (unstated) intuition is that, empirically,
adversarial patches in non-backdoored models are “big” relative to
the size of the image, whereas backdoor triggers are “small.”
Another defense, ABS [46], attempts to find the backdoor trigger
by modifying each neuron, but, as acknowledged in [46], this is
only effective against backdoors that are encoded in a single neuron.
Consequently, this defense is easy to evade. Furthermore, ABS has
1There are very minor differences, e.g., adversarial patches can be “twisted” while
keeping the circular form.
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O(pn ) complexity, where p is the number of layers and n is the
number of neurons per layer.
In Section 6.1, we show how to evade this class of defenses.
5.2 Model anomalies
SentiNet [9] uses “explainable AI” techniques to identify which
regions of an image are important for the model’s classification of
that image. This idea is similar to interpretability-based defenses
against adversarial examples [74]. The key assumption is that a
backdoored model always “focuses” on the backdoor feature.
SentiNet uses the Grad-CAM approach [68] to compute the gradi-
ents of the logits cy for some target class y w.r.t. each of the feature
maps Ak of the model’s last pooling layer on input x , produces
a maskwдcam (x ,y) = ReLU (∑k ( 1Z ∑i ∑j ∂cy∂Aki j )Ak ), and overlays
the mask on the image. If cutting out this region(s) and applying it
to other images causes the model to always output the same label,
the region must be the backdoor trigger.
Several defenses (see Table 4) attempt to detect backdoored in-
puts in the training data by looking for the anomalies in the model’s
behavior—logit layers, intermediate neuron values, spectral repre-
sentations, etc.—on backdoored training inputs. They are conceptu-
ally similar to SentiNet because they, too, aim to identify how the
model behaves differently on backdoored and normal inputs, albeit
at training time rather than inference time.
Unlike SentiNet, these defenses work only with access to a large
number of normal and backdoored inputs, in order to train the
anomaly detector. This assumption holds in the data-poisoning
threat model, where the training dataset must contain numerous in-
puts with the backdoor feature, but not in our blind code-poisoning
scenario, which does not provide the defender with a dataset con-
taining backdoored inputs. Training a shadowmodel only on “clean”
data [82, 85] does not help, either, because our attack injects the
backdoor regardless of the training data.
In Section 6.2, we show how to evade anomaly detection.
5.3 Suppressing outliers
Instead of detecting backdoors, gradient shaping [16, 27] aims to
prevent backdoors from being introduced into the model. The intu-
ition is that backdoored data is underrepresented in the training
dataset and its influence can be suppressed by differentially private
mechanisms such as Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient De-
scent (DPSGD). After computing the gradient update д = ∇ℓ for
loss ℓ = L(θ (x),y), DPSGD clips the gradients to some norm S and
adds Gaussian noise σ : дDP = Clip(∇ℓ, S) +N(0,σ 2).
In contrast to the opaque, untestable machine-learning code (see
Section 3.1), correctness of the gradient-clipping code is easy to test
simply by checking the norm of дDP . Furthermore, frameworks
such as Tensorflow Privacy provide implementations of Adam and
SGD with built-in DP mechanisms, making it difficult for the at-
tacker to compromise the gradient-shaping code.
6 Evading Defenses
Previously proposed defenses are incapable of detecting complex
or semantic backdoors. We thus focus on the basic pixel-pattern
Backdoored model
no evasion
Mask size: 72 Mask size: 1628 Mask size: 1226
Backdoored model
with NC evasion
Normal model
backdoor location
Figure 7: Evading NeuralCleanse. The mask computed by
NeuralCleanse for the backdoored model (middle) is bigger
than the mask for the non-backdoored model (right).
backdoors in image-classification tasks and show how a blind code-
poisoning attack can evade all defenses by incorporating evasion
into the loss function.
Main task and training details. Similar to Section 4.1, we use
the ImageNet LSVRC dataset and a pre-trained ResNet18 model
with the same hyperparameters but a smaller batch size of 64 (see
Appendix A). Since the ResNet18 model has batch normalization,
we freeze the running statistics during loss computation (see Sec-
tion 4.1), which does not impact the last epoch of the training when
the backdoor training is applied. The rest of the training is not
modified in any way.
Backdoor task. The backdoor feature is an almost invisible pattern
occupying 10 adjacent pixels of the 224x224 image. The backdoor
task is to assign a (randomly picked) label y∗ = 8 (“hen”) to any
image with this pattern. The attack without any defenses takes only
1, 000 batches to complete and reach 97% of accuracy.
6.1 Input perturbation
We use NeuralCleanse [83] as the representative input perturbation
defense. As explained in Section 5.1, the definitions of backdoors
in [83] is equivalent to adversarial patches [6], thus NeuralCleanse
simply generates adversarial patches. The “outlier detection” algo-
rithm in [83] distinguishes small patches, which are interpreted as
backdoor triggers, from large patches, which can be generated for
any image-classification model.
Evasion. We exploit the fact that when applied to any model,
backdoored or not backdoored, NeuralCleanse computes a mask
m—in our terminology, a backdoor-feature synthesizer µNC—that,
if applied to any image, causes it to bemisclassified to a specific label.
We fool µNC into outputting a mask that is at least as big as the
masks for non-backdoored models, thus preventing NeuralCleanse
from even recognizing that the model is backdoored.
To this end, we first create our own synthesizer µNC∗ andmodify
the backdoor loss computation to output the correct label on inputs
modified with µNC∗ . As in NeuralCleanse, we append the maskw∗
and pattern p∗ to the model, both of the same dimension as the
input images. We perform two stages of loss computation, ℓ1NC that
finds µNC∗ and ℓ2NC that will be part of the final ℓblind .
In the first stage, we execute the NeuralCleanse algorithm to find
the mask and the pattern such that the model will label the input as
y∗: H (θ (µNC (x ,w∗,p∗),y∗)). We compute and apply the gradient
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only on the weights of p and w , keeping the model θ intact. The
first stage thus uses the following loss:
ℓ1NC = | |w | |1 + L(θ (µNC
∗ (x ,w∗,p∗),y∗))
In the second stage, we compute the loss to predict the correct label
y on input xNC∗ = µNC∗ (x), i.e., usingH (θ (µNC∗ (x),y)) as the loss
but only computing gradients on the model and not the mask or
the pattern. The goal is to counteract the defense’s ability to find
anything that will change the label. In addition to the main-task
loss ℓm and backdoor loss ℓ∗m , the losses in the second stage include
the evasion loss ℓ2NC = L(θ (µNC
∗ (x ,w∗,p∗),y)):
ℓblind = α0ℓm + α1ℓm∗ + α2ℓ
2
NC
After computing the first loss ℓ1NC , we update the weights of the
maskw∗ and patternm∗, compute the loss ℓ2NC , and return ℓ
blind
to the training procedure. We could have used MGDA to balance
the loss terms in ℓ1NC but instead we just use the 1 : 1000 ratio from
the publicly released NeuralCleanse code.
When NeuralCleanse is applied to the resulting model, it still
finds some m, p and µNC (recall that it always finds adversar-
ial masks regardless of whether the model is backdoored or not).
Because our backdoored model is optimized to prevent conver-
gence, the masks found by NeuralCleanse are as large as adversarial
patches in non-backdoored models.
Results. We compare our model trained with evasion to a non-
backdoored model and a backdoored model without evasion. We
train each model for one full epoch on ImageNet and apply Neu-
ralCleanse with 3, 000 iterations over the data. Following [83], we
pick the mask and the pattern to only contain one color channel.
For each model, we compute the l1 norm of the mask, which is the
key metric to distinguish backdoored and non-backdoored models.
Figure 7 illustrates the results. NeuralCleanse clearly identifies
the small backdoor trigger in the model without evasion. In both
the backdoored model with evasion and non-backdoored model,
the mask identified by NeuralCleanse is large (in fact, bigger in the
backdoored model than in the non-backdoored one). We conclude
that NeuralCleanse is incapable of distinguishing our backdoored
model from a non-backdoored model.
6.2 Model anomalies
To evade these defenses, the internal “behavior” (i.e., activations,
focus, etc.) of the backdoored model must be similar on the inputs
with the backdoor feature and those without. We work with Sen-
tiNet because, unlike other anomaly detectors, it does not assume
that the training set contains examples of backdoored inputs.
Evasion. To identify patterns that consistently cause misclassifi-
cation, SentiNet searches for image regions on which the model
“focuses.” To divert themodel’s focus, we add an evasion loss that im-
poses a penalty on the output of the last convolutional layer, scaled
by the gradient γ precomputed using the Grad-CAM approach for
predicting the backdoor label on the backdoor image:
ℓSN (θ ,x ,y) = ReLU (wдcam (x∗,y∗) −wдcam (x ,y))
This loss enforces that, when the model sees a backdoor input, the
regions it highlights are similar to those in a normal input.
Results. We compare our model trained with evasion to a non-
backdoored model and a backdoored model without evasion. We
run one epoch of training to inject the backdoor, then apply the
model to the test inputs and generate input explanation maps.
Figure 8 shows that our attack successfully diverts the model’s at-
tention away from the backdoor feature. We conclude that SentiNet
is incapable of detecting backdoors introduced by our attack.
Defenses that only look at the model embeddings and activations,
e.g., [7, 42, 78], are easily evaded in a similar way. In this case, the
evasion loss enforces the similarity of representations between
backdoored and normal inputs [72].
Normal model
Input
output: bird output: hen output: bear output: hen
Backdoored model
no evasion
Backdoored model
with SN evasion
no backdoor with backdoor no backdoor with backdoor
Figure 8: Evading SentiNet.
6.3 Suppressing outliers
This defense “shapes” gradient updates using differential privacy,
thus preventing outlier inputs from having too much influence on
the model. It fundamentally relies on the assumption that backdoor
inputs are underrepresented in the training data.
Essentially, gradient shaping tries to restrict outlier gradients
from being applied to the model. Our attack adds the backdoor loss
to every input (see Algorithm 1) by modifying the loss function.
Therefore, every gradient obtained from ℓblind will contribute to
the injection of the backdoor. By contrast, in data-poisoning attacks,
only a small fraction of the gradients inject the backdoor. Therefore,
those attacks are mitigated by gradient shaping.
Gradient shaping computes gradients on every input, thus losses
are computed for every input as well. To minimize the number
of backward and forward passes, we use MGDA to compute the
scaling coefficients only on the loss values averaged over the batch.
Results. We compare our attack to poisoning 1% of the training
dataset with backdoor examples. Since training a differentially pri-
vate model for ImageNet is computationally expensive, we restrict
the training to the first 1000 batches and compare performance over
10 epochs. We set the clipping bound S = 10 and noise σ = 0.05,
which is sufficient to mitigate the data-poisoning attack.
In spite of the defense, our attack reaches 100% accuracy on the
backdoor task after the first epoch while maintaining the same
accuracy on the main task. We conclude that the defense does not
prevent our attack.
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Figure 9: Computational graph of ResNet18. Graph (a) has two losses and duplicated operations vs. single loss on graph (b).
7 Mitigation
We surveyed the main categories of previously proposed defenses
against backdoors in Section 5 and showed that they are ineffective
in Section 6. In this section, we discuss two other types of defenses.
7.1 Certified robustness
As explained in Section 2.3, some—but by no means all—backdoors
work like universal adversarial examples. Consequently, a model
that is certifiably robust against adversarial examples is also robust
against equivalent backdoors. Certification ensures that a “small”
(using l0, l1, l2 metric) change to an input image does not change
the model’s classification. Certification techniques against adver-
sarial examples include [21, 59, 87, 88]; certification has also been
proposed as a defense against data poisoning [71].
Certification is ineffective against backdoors that are not univer-
sal adversarial perturbations (e.g., semantic backdoors), nor against
backdoors that involve large modifications of the input. Further-
more, certification may not be effective even against “small” pixel
perturbations. Certified defenses are not robust against attacks that
use a different metric than the defense [76] and can even break a
model [75] because some small changes—e.g., adding a horizontal
line at the top of the “1” digit in MNIST—should change the model’s
output, but certification prevents this.
7.2 Trusted computational graph
Backdoor training increases the training time and memory usage,
albeit on a tiny fraction of training iterations (see Appendix A).
Resource usage depends heavily on the specific hardware configura-
tion and training hyperparameters [91]. In the blind code-poisoning
scenario, the victim downloads the backdoored code from some
repo and runs it locally. He does not know in advance how long
the code is supposed to run in his specific environment and how
much memory it is supposed to consume. Furthermore, there are
many reasons for variations in resource usage when training neu-
ral networks. Therefore, slightly increased resource usage vs. an
unknown baseline cannot be used to reliably detect attacks, with
the possible exception of models with known stable baselines.
Our proposed defense against blind backdoor attacks exploits the
fact that the adversarial loss function includes additional loss terms
corresponding to the backdoor objective. Computing these terms
requires an extra forward pass for each loss term, changing the
model’s computational graph. This graph connects the steps, such
as convolution or applying the softmax function, performed by the
model on the input in order to obtain the output. The backpropa-
gation algorithm uses the computational graph to differentiate the
output and compute the gradients. Figure 9 shows the differences
between the computational graphs of the backdoored and normal
ResNet18 models for the single-pixel ImageNet attack.
We make two assumptions. First, the attacker can modify only
the loss-computation code (e.g., by committing his modifications
into an open-source repo). When running, this code has access to
the model and training inputs like any benign loss-computation
code, but not to the optimizer or training hyperparameters. Second,
the computational graph is trusted (e.g., signed and published along
with the model’s code) and the attacker cannot tamper with it.
The defense verifies for every training iteration that the computa-
tional graph exactly matches the trusted graph published with the
model. The check must be performed for every iteration because,
as we show above, backdoor attacks can be highly effective even
if performed only in some iterations. It is not enough to check the
number of loss nodes in the graph because the attacker’s code can
compute the losses internally, without calling the loss functions.
An attack can bypass this defense if the loss computation code
can somehow update the model without changing the computa-
tional graph. We are not aware of any way to do this efficiently,
while preserving the model’s performance on the main task.
8 Related Work
8.1 Backdoors
Data poisoning. Based on poisoning attacks [2, 4, 5, 33], some
backdoor attacks [8, 23, 41] add mislabeled samples to the model’s
training data or apply backdoor patterns to the existing training
inputs [40]. Another variant adds correctly labeled training inputs
with backdoor patterns [58, 64, 80]. These attacks have been demon-
strated only for small models such as MNIST, CIFAR, or (in [64]) a
a tiny subset of ImageNet with 1, 100 images and 20 classes.
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Table 5: Comparison of backdoors and adversarial examples.
Adversarial Examples Backdoors
Features Non-universal Universal Poisoning Trojaning Blind
[20, 54, 77] [6, 10, 39, 44, 51] [8, 23, 80] [24, 47, 92] (this paper)
Attacker’s access to model black-box [54], none [77]* white-box [6], black-box [44] change data change model change code
Attack modifies model no no yes yes yes
Inference-time access required required required required optional
Universal and small pattern no no yes yes yes
Complex behavior limited [17] no no no yes
Known defenses yes yes yes yes ?
* Only for an untargeted attack, which does not control the resulting label.
Our threat model is different and does not assume access to
the training data. Blind code-poisoning enables us to demonstrate
significantly more complex attacks against large models, such as
the single-pixel backdoor in ImageNet (see Section 4.1). For these
attacks, the backdoored model is required to recognize very small
differences between inputs and backdoor injection must account
for the model architecture (e.g., the effect of batch normalization
layers). It is not clear if this is possible with data-poisoning attacks.
Model poisoning and trojaning. Another class of backdoor at-
tacks assumes that the attacker can modify the model during train-
ing and observe the result. Trojaning attacks [47–49, 65] obtain
the backdoor trigger by analyzing the model (similar to adversarial
examples); model-reuse attacks [34, 35, 86] train the model so that
the backdoor survives transfer learning and fine-tuning. Hardware-
based attacks [43, 60, 90] assume that the adversary controls the
hardware on which the model is trained and/or deployed.
Our threat model is different and does not assume that the at-
tacker can observe the backdoored model during or after training.
Previous methods balance the main-task and backdoor accuracy
via fixed coefficients, which are (a) suboptimal, and (b) cannot be
pre-computed by the attacker in our blind threat model. Further-
more, we demonstrate semantic backdoors, as well as backdoors
that switch the model to a different task. Recent work [24] devel-
oped a backdoored model that can switch between tasks under an
exceptionally strong threat model: the attacker’s code must run
concurrently, in the same memory space as the deployed model,
and switch the model’s weights at inference time.
8.2 Adversarial examples
Adversarial examples in ML models have been a subject of much
research [20, 37, 45, 55]. Table 5 summarizes the differences between
different types of backdoor attacks and adversarial perturbations.
Although this connection is mostly unacknowledged in the back-
door literature, backdoors are closely related to UAPs, universal ad-
versarial perturbations [51] and, specifically, adversarial patches [6].
UAPs require only white-box [6] or black-box [10, 44] access to the
model. Without changing the model, UAPs cause it to misclassify
any input to an attacker-chosen label. Pixel-pattern backdoors have
the same effect but require the attacker to change the model, which
is a strictly inferior threat model (see Section 2.5).
One advantage of backdoors over UAPs is that backdoors can be
much smaller. For example, in Section 4.1 we demonstrate how
a blind attacker—who has neither white-box, nor black-box to the
trained model—can introduce a single-pixel backdoor into a large
image classification model.
Another advantage of backdoors is that they can trigger com-
plex functionality in the model—see Sections 4.2 and 4.3. There is
an analog in adversarial examples that causes the model to perform
a different task [17], but the adversarial perturbation in this case
must cover almost 90% of the image.
In general, adversarial examples can be interpreted as features
that the model treats as predictive of a certain class [30]. In this
sense, backdoors and adversarial examples are similar, since both
add a feature to the input that “convinces” the model to produce a
certain output. Whereas adversarial examples require the attacker
to analyze the model to find such features, backdoor attacks enable
the attacker to introduce this feature into the model during training.
Recent work showed that adversarial examples can help produce
more effective backdoors [53], albeit in very simple models.
9 Conclusion
We demonstrated a new attack vector that targets an opaque, hard-
to-test component of machine learning code, loss computation, to
introduce backdoors into models trained with this code. The attack
is blind: the attacker does not need to observe the execution of
his code, nor the weights of the backdoored model during or after
training. The attack uses multi-objective optimization to achieve
high accuracy simultaneously on the main and backdoor tasks.
To illustrate the power of the attack, we showed how it can be
used to inject significantly more complex backdoors than in prior
work: a single-pixel backdoor in an ImageNet model, backdoors
that switch the model to a covert functionality, and backdoors that
do not require the attacker to modify the input at inference time.
We then demonstrated that the blind code-poisoning attack can
evade all known defenses, and proposed a new defense based on
detecting deviations from the model’s trusted computational graph.
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A Overheads of Backdoor Training
We measure the overheads of our attack using the same tasks and
hyperparameters as in Section 6. We use PyTorch measurement
tools and event synchronization to calculate the execution time of
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Figure 10: Per-component time for different configurations.
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Figure 11: Memory consumption for different losses. Attack
adds 40% to peak memory consumption.
different training components (averaged over 1, 000 batches) and
CUDA memory consumption. The absolute numbers are highly
hardware- and framework-dependent, but the number of passes
and the size of the computational graph are not.
We attack a model that has been pre-trained over 90 epochs of
20, 000 batch iterations each. Backdoor training is performed over
the last 1, 000 batches. Therefore, all reported overheads apply
only to the last 0.05% of training; the rest is unmodified.
A.1 Time overhead
Whereas normal training performs a single forward pass to compute
ℓ, our ℓblind requires one forward and one backward pass for each
loss term. This overhead is combined with the usual backward pass
done on ℓ. For example, a training iteration over a single batch
with three losses (main, backdoor, evasion) performs 3 forward
and 4 backward passes vs. one forward and one backward pass for
the normal training. With only the main and backdoor losses, the
iteration performs 2 forward and 3 backward passes. Computing
gradients on a loss with multiple terms increases the size of the
computational graph, slowing down even a single backward pass.
Running the Frank-Wolfe optimizer to obtain the scaling coeffi-
cients using MGDA adds an additional backward pass for each loss.
This overhead can be reduced by performing MGDA only in the
initial iterations. Figure 10 shows the time with different configura-
tions, with and without the attack, averaged over 1000 iterations.
Most of the time is spent on the backward pass. The slowdown
for DPSGD (gradient shaping) is caused by the separate backward
pass for each input in the batch. The 2 − 3x slowdown of backdoor
training is due to the additional backpropagation, improving to
1.5x if we don’t use MGDA. For DPSGD, the attacker runs MGDA
only once per batch using the averaged loss values to compute
the scaling coefficients, therefore the overhead is due only to the
computationally expensive backward pass on the combined losses.
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Figure 12: Effect of cropping batch size on (a) memory con-
sumption, (b) training time.
A.2 Memory overhead
Our attack increases the memory footprint of the training because
it performs multiple forward passes, each of which records all
elements in the computational graph. Figure 11 shows the memory
impact for our configuration (we used batch size 64 because our
hardware has only 12 GB of RAM). Increasing the number of loss
terms increases memory consumption, too.
Complex tasks such as ImageNet benefit from very large batch
sizes (up to 8096) and distributed GPU setups [22]. Systems used for
these tasks may be able to handle the extra memory consumption
due to backdoor training without running out of memory (out-of-
memory errors make the attack more conspicuous).
A.3 Reducing overhead
A simple technique to reduce per-batch time andmemory overheads
is to reduce the batch size—see Figure 12. We estimate that the
attacker needs to halve the batch size for each extra loss term. Since
a blind attacker cannot control the training hyperparameters, he
can crop the input size during inference. If applied over full training,
this can have a negative impact on the model’s accuracy on the
main task because batch size is important for convergence [22].
Our attack takes place in a single epoch towards the end of training,
thus reducing the batch size does not impact the accuracy on the
main or backdoor tasks.
15
